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Comments on McGraw, “Against the Combination of Materialism and Direct Realism” 
 
In his contribution “Against the Combination of Materialism and Direct Realism”, David McGraw argues 
that direct realism conflicts with materialism. There are fundamental differences between the 
phenomenal qualities of our perceptual experiences and the properties of the physical things we 
perceive. So the attempt to spell out the phenomenal character of perceptual experience in terms of 
features of the things we experience is bound to lead to trouble for a proponent of materialism. 
In this comment, I will argue that there need not be any conflict between direct realism and materialism, 
given a proper understanding of direct realism and the replies available to the view. 
McGraw holds that, when a subject sees a wall, she has a visual impression of it, in virtue of which she 
perceives the actual wall. He argues that the impression is numerically distinct from the wall by pointing 
out that the wall keeps on existing when the subject looks away and thus loses the impression. The 
impression is within the perceiver, according to McGraw. 
The claim that there is a visual impression could be interpreted in at least two ways. On the one hand, it 
might be the claim that when the subject sees the wall, she undergoes a visual mental state. If this is the 
reading McGraw intends, his claim seems correct yet unsurprising: Certainly, while seeing a wall 
presupposes that there is a wall, it is not the same as a wall. The former is a mental event or state of the 
subject, the latter a (distinct) object in the world. Direct realists are not concerned with denying that 
there is a difference here.  
The problem one might raise for a materialist with regard to the phenomenal qualities of perceptual 
states is the traditional worry of how phenomenal properties can be reduced to material or physical 
properties of the subject, such as functional properties or neural properties. One response to this 
problem that is available to direct realists with materialist commitments is to deny that there are any 
phenomenal properties of experience. This has been argued by Tye (2000) by appeal to the argument 
from transparency, for instance. (The argument says that there is no introspective evidence of qualia as 
intrinsic features of experience: When I try to focus on the phenomenal properties involved in 
experience, I inexorably end up with what experience presents as features of objects out there.) Crudely 
put, Tye’s point is that the phenomenal character of experience is not to be understood in terms of 
qualitative properties that the experience itself has, but has to be reduced to what it represents, its 
content. 
On the other hand, the visual impression might be the direct object sensed by the subject, something 
along the lines of a sense-datum. Taken this way, McGraw’s claim comes down to the indirect realist 
position that we are confronted with things in the world only indirectly, by immediately being in touch 
with sense-data, ideas, or the like. As far as I can tell, this is the claim he is making. Compare the 
following quote (p. 3): “Human subjects are aware of the colors and other attributes that belong to 
physical objects as physical only by starting with phenomenal colors and attributes.” According to 
McGraw, this is an undeniable fact about perceptual experience. But this is exactly what direct realism is 
committed to denying. On this view, what we are directly aware of in perception are features of the 
things we perceive themselves. There are no impressions within in the perceiver that mediate her 
perception of her surroundings. In light of this, there is no need to worry about whether they, by 
contrast with worldly objects, stop existing when the subject looks away. If McGraw wants to argue 
otherwise, he needs to provide reasons why we should introduce such entities as impressions into our 
ontology in the first place. 
But isn’t there still a problem for the direct realist? She says that the phenomenal character of 
perceptual experience is due to its object or content. (The exact claim varies, for instance between 
intentionalist versions of direct realism such as Tye’s and naïve realist versions like Mike Martin’s 
(1997).) But, as McGraw argues, the features of physical things that we perceive are often categorically 
different from how these things strike us. For example, temperature is a statistical property and color a 
complicated reflectance property, even though the warmth I feel or the shade of red that I see appear to 
be simple features of things around me. (p. 4) While it would take me too far afield to elaborate on 
direct realist responses to this problem, let me point out that they can insist that we perceive 
complicated dispositional or statistical properties by perceiving their concrete manifestations. These 
manifestations are concrete properties instantiated by the perceived objects, so it is not surprising that 
they appear to be simple, intrinsic properties. Further, direct realists don’t have to claim that our 
perceptual experiences give us full and transparent disclosure of the things they represent, including 
their physical structure or statistical properties. 
A different response available to direct realists is to endorse a non-reductive materialism. John 
McDowell (1994), for instance, seems to be open to this view, which appeals to different, equally correct 
levels of description and explanation of reality. The undeniable directness of our perceptual engagement 
with the world is captured at the personal level of explanation. This doesn’t conflict with the correctness 
of explanations at subpersonal levels of explanation, all the way down to the quantum level, that 
describe and explain the world by appeal not to midsized objects, but to atoms or the like. 
What about the fact that the phenomenal character of seeing a wall vanishes once the subject looks 
away from the wall, whereas the wall, including its perceptible features, continues to exist? Doesn’t this 
show that the phenomenal character of the subject’s visual experience cannot arise from the wall and its 
properties? Direct realists can reply that the wall’s visible features give rise to the phenomenal character 
of an experience of looking at the wall only when there is such an experience. But even when the subject 
looks away, the wall has these features that are available for her to perceive. It is in virtue of presenting 
her with these features that this is exactly what it is like for her to undergo the visual experience of the 
wall. 
Towards the end of his contribution, McGraw himself appears to endorse a version of direct realism. He 
claims – quite plausibly – that the processes going on in the perceptual system are not something that 
obstructs the perceiver’s contact with her surroundings. He also accepts the argument from 
transparency. I am not sure how to square these statements with his claim, quoted above, that we 
become aware of things in the world and their properties only via our contact with the phenomenal 
qualities of intra-mental impressions. Let me end my comment by suggesting that he should give up on 
this latter claim in favor of an all-out direct realist picture of perception. 
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